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predecessors. Unlike prior studies, we find that people do view housing as a source of wealth that can
help them finance their retirement needs. Indeed, a substantial fraction of older households do move, and
in the process, they appear to liquidate some home equity which they convert to financial assets.
Consequently, some of the home equity extraction observed in recent years may be related to the aging of
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Chapter 14
Retiring on the House?
Cross-Cohort Differences
in Housing Wealth
Julia L. Coronado, Dean Maki, and Ben Weitzer

As the leading edge of the Baby Boom generation turns 60, there is growing
interest in how well this large group has prepared for retirement and
how it will manage its assets in later life. There has been concern among
the popular media, policymakers, and academic economists that Boomers
have not saved enough for retirement, and indeed Figure 14-1 indicates
a precipitous decline in the personal saving rate as Boomers have moved
through adulthood.
This chapter evaluates the role of housing wealth in Baby Boomers’
retirement prospects to determine what role housing wealth will play in
their retirement well-being. Our approach compares the wealth position of
the leading edge of the Boomers with that of the generation immediately
preceding it, in the years just prior to retirement. We rely on the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS) and compare persons aged 51–61 in 1992,
whom we refer to as the original HRS cohort, with the Early Baby Boomers
(EBBs) interviewed at age 51–56 in 2004. We conclude that Boomers do
have more valuable homes, but they have also borrowed more against these.
As a result, they have a similar fraction of assets allocated to home equity as
their predecessors. On net, however, the median EBB member had similar
home equity and net worth compared to previous retirees at the same
age. When we assess how the original HRS respondents have managed
their home equity over the period 1992–2004, we find that—unlike prior
studies—people do view housing as a source of wealth that can help them
finance their retirement needs. Indeed, a substantial fraction of older
households do move; and in the process, they appear to liquidate some
home equity which they convert to financial assets. Consequently, some
of the home equity extraction observed in recent years may be related to
the aging of the population, rather than a cyclical response to rapid house
appreciation.
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Figure 14-1. Personal saving as a percentage of disposable income between the
ages of 28 and 51. (Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (various years); Haver
Analytics (various years).)

Comparing Early Baby Boomers with
Their Predecessors
Previous research that has evaluated Boomers’ retirement prospects has
generally taken one of two approaches.1 One compares Boomers’ finances
with those of previous generations at a similar age. As we show below,
these studies have typically concluded that Baby Boomer households have
higher incomes and are accumulating wealth at a similar or greater pace
than previous generations. So in an absolute sense, Boomers, on average,
are doing as well or better than their parents. Indeed, though aggregate
saving rates have declined, this is partly a response to capital gains on assets
which have led households in the aggregate to accumulate significantly
more wealth as shown in Figure 14-2. That said, increasing inequality has
also been noted: the lowest income households among Boomers appear to
be worse off economically than previous generations (Butrica et al., this
volume; Manchester et al., this volume).
A second set of studies evaluates the retirement preparedness of Baby
Boomers by asking whether they have accumulated enough wealth to
sustain their standard of living through retirement (Moore and Mitchell
2000). Their higher real household incomes, combined with static retirement timing, would imply that they need to accumulate more wealth in
order to maintain the higher consumption through retirement. This second literature is far from uniform in its conclusions, in part because authors
differ in their economic assumptions and definitions of wealth.
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Figure 14-2. The ratio of net worth to disposable income between the ages of 28
and 51. (Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (various years); Haver Analytics
(various years).)

A main bone of contention has been the question of whether home
equity should be included as a retirement asset. In our view, it seems
unreasonable to exclude housing wealth when evaluating retirement preparedness, inasmuch as home equity accounts for 43 percent of net worth
for the median household and more than one-third of aggregate household wealth.2 It is true that, in the past, there were only limited ways for
retirees to tap home equity, short of selling their homes. It is also true
that elderly persons appeared to be reluctant to sell their homes unless
confronted with the death of a spouse or a serious illness.3 Thus housing
wealth appeared to serve as insurance against adverse events, but not as a
source of wealth to finance general consumption needs other than shelter.
Nevertheless, the fact that housing satisfies the need for shelter would seem
to necessitate its inclusion in evaluating retirement preparedness. Shelter
accounts for between 15 and 33 percent of total consumption needs.4 And
not surprisingly, if home equity is included as an asset, this produces a more
favorable assessment of Boomers’ preparedness for retirement. In any case,
the question remains open as to whether households are tapping into their
home equity appropriately for two reasons. First, Boomers are beginning to
transition into retirement with a great deal of home equity. Second, markets
have developed for tapping into home equity; indeed, home equity loans
now account for 12 percent of all mortgage debt. In addition, the size of the
reverse mortgage market, where older households can obtain an annuity
stream of income from their home equity, has doubled in each of the past
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Table 14-1 Comparing the Wealth and Home Equity Position of the
Original HRS and Early Baby Boomers at Age 51–56

1. Year surveyed
2. Number of respondents
3. Married
4. Some college education or higher
5. Retired
6. Has DB pension
7. Home ownership
8. Median net worth ($)
9. Median net worth per capita ($)
10. Net worth/household income
11. Median home value ($)
12. Median equity in home
13. Median home equity/net worth

Original HRS

EBB

1992
5,722
77.9%
42.1%
11.5%
64.1%
80.3%
153,444
83,116
2.40
100,950
84.0%
44.0%

2004
4,330
70.3%
57.3%
12.1%
54.7%
82.9%
155, 000
90,250
2.13
140,000
65.9%
43.8%

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Dollar amounts in $2004.

five years. In 2005, roughly $3.6 billion in reverse mortgages was issued
against homes valued at $11 billion.5 This market remains small compared
to the over $1 trillion mortgage market that year; it does appear that older
households can increasingly use their home equity to finance retirement
needs.
Table 14-1 permits an assessment of the comparative economic positions
of the original HRS and EBB cohorts (all dollar figures are in $2004).
We focus on persons aged 51–56 in 2004 and 1992. As others have noted,
Boomers are less likely to be married, are better educated, and are less likely
to be covered by a defined benefit (DB) pension than the HRS generation.
Both generations had similarly low rates of retirement in their early 50s and
remarkably similar median net worth, though the EBB cohort had higher
per capita net worth and a lower ratio of net worth to household income
owing to the smaller household size and higher household incomes.
Turning to housing wealth, we note that the Early Boomers had a slightly
higher rate of home ownership, and they owned homes worth nearly
40 percent more than the HRS cohort. This is not terribly surprising given
that the EBB group was interviewed in 2004 after a housing boom that, as
shown in Figure 14-3, had lasted nearly a decade. The EBB group is indeed
more leveraged with only 66 percent equity versus 84 percent for the HRS
cohort (equity in home is calculated as market value of the home minus
all mortgage debt as a fraction of home value). But because the Boomers’
homes are more valuable, the percentage of their portfolio devoted to
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Figure 14-3. Real home price appreciation between the ages of 28 and 51
(% change, year on year). (Source: OFHEO (various years); Haver Analytics (various
years).)

home equity is nearly identical to the HRS generation. In other words, the
two groups had very similar percentage allocations to housing and financial
assets, as they approached retirement. Subsequently, the portfolio of the
HRS group then experienced the boom and bust of the equity markets, as
well as the housing market boom; nonetheless, the two groups were quite
similarly situated prior to retirement.
More detail on the distribution of housing wealth across the two generations is provided in Table 14-2. Here households are divided into quintiles
of household income, and the picture painted by the aggregate statistics
holds up in this more disaggregated view. Increasing home ownership
is evident for the younger EBB cohort, and home ownership rates and
median home values were higher for every quintile of the EBB generation.
Likewise, the data are consistent with more liberal credit markets across the
income spectrum, as each EBB quintile had greater leverage (evidenced by
the lower median equity in their homes). The share of home equity in total
net worth is basically similar across generations by quintile; it is a touch
higher for lower HRS quintiles and a bit lower for upper income groups.
The ratio of net worth to income is higher for the HRS group in all but the
middle income quintile.
In other words, the evidence suggests that, despite higher leverage, the
Early Boomers were similarly positioned to the prior generation, just before
retirement. Some of the EBBs’ increased leverage can thus be viewed as an
asset allocation move to keep their portfolio from being overweighed in
home equity after an extended period of appreciation in home values. This
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Table 14-2 Comparison of Home Ownership and Values for the HRS and Early
Baby Boom Generations at Age 51–56, by Household Income
Quintile
First
Original HRS
1. Home ownership
2. Median home value ($)
3. Median equity in home
4. Median home
equity/net worth
5. Net worth/household
income
Early Baby Boomers
1. Home ownership
2. Median home value ($)
3. Median equity in home
4. Median home
equity/net worth
5. Net worth/household
income

Second

51.5%
13,460
56.0%
0
0.5

60.1%
30,000
42.2%
0
0.4

74.4%
74,030
73.1%
59.5%
1.58

80.4%
95,000
58.0%
57.8%
1.4

Third

Fourth

84.2%
94,220
81.5%
52.3%
2.07

86.3%
145,000
64.2%
54.9%
2.3

Fifth

89.5%
134,600
85.0%
47.0%

97.1%
235,550
100%
28.5%

3.4

91.7%
200,000
66.6%
51.5%

7.69

95.2%
375,000
78.6%
33.8%

3.0

7.1

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Dollar amounts in $2004.

portfolio shifting view is also quite consistent with aggregate data. Many
observers, including former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, credited the extraction of home equity with supporting consumption spending
through the most recent economic downturn (Figure 14-4). But the flows
of money out of home equity through increased leverage have roughly
paralleled the flows of funds into financial assets.
Clearly retirement preparedness rests on more than housing, and
Boomers face lower levels of DB pension coverage, longer life spans, and
looming Social Security and Medicare deficits. Consequently, Boomers may
not be able to retire at the same age and maintain their standard of living
during retirement if they continue to retire early. Yet estimates of saving adequacy respond dramatically to assumptions about retirement ages.
Moore and Mitchell (1997) show how required saving rates are cut in half,
if retirement is delayed from 62 to 65. And there is at least a suggestion that
Boomers may retire later than their predecessors (Maestas, this volume).

Housing Wealth and Retirement Needs: A Focus
on the HRS Cohort
Next we assess how the HRS generation has managed its housing investments, as it has moved through retirement. Specifically, we evaluate the
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Figure 14-4. Home equity appears to be moving into financial assets ($ billions,
4-quarter moving average). (Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (various
years); Haver Analytics (various years).)

extent to which the HRS generation has drawn down its home equity to
finance its retirement needs. This may offer insights into how the EBB
generation will manage its housing investments going forward.
The periods during which we observe the HRS cohort are the years
between 1992 and 2004. This was a time characterized by first booming,
and then falling, equity markets, and then a surging housing market. As
Figure 14-2 indicated, on balance, this was a time when net worth grew
rapidly relative to disposable income. Since rates of appreciation in both
of these asset classes were well beyond their historical norms, at least some
portion of this appreciation likely came as a surprise, particularly to the
HRS generation who had already reached its peak saving period. This
makes it a difficult period to assess the degree and patterns of wealth
drawdown.
Some of the same questions are evaluated by Venti and Wise (2001),
who ask whether people give up their homes in later life and whether
the amount invested in home equity declines with age. They concluded
that retirees do not view their home equity as an asset available to finance
retirement needs. We approach this question somewhat differently, since
in our view, giving up home ownership is a crude way for older persons
to access home equity. Furthermore, the fact that the housing market was
booming over this period implies that it is unlikely to observe outright
declines in the value of home equity. Instead, we explore changes in the
share of home equity in retirees’ total portfolios, how this share changed
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Table 14-3 Comparison of Housing and Wealth Measures for the
HRS Generation as They Transitioned into
Retirement
Year

1992

1. Age of primary respondent
2. Number of respondents
3. Married
5. Retired
6. Has DB pension
7. Home ownership
8. Median net worth ($)
9. Median net worth per capita ($)
10. Net worth/household income
11. Median home value ($)
12. Median equity in home
13. Median home equity/net worth

51−56
5,722
77.9%
11.5%
64.1%
80.3%
153,444
83,116
2.40
100,950
84%
44.0%

2004
63−68
4,127
68.7%
62.1%
71.9%
85.1%
207,000
123,000
4.43
133,000
95%
44.5%

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Dollar amounts in $2004.

over this period, and whether those who moved were more likely to tap
into this source of wealth, either for rebalancing into financial assets or
to finance consumption needs. Accordingly, an examination of movers’
choices can shed light on what the unconstrained choices of retirees might
look like.
Table 14-3 reports key aspects of the HRS cohort in 1992 and again in
2004. Just under two-thirds of the sample were retired by 2004 (when they
were aged 63–68). Some respondents are lost owing to death and nonresponse, and there is a decline in the marriage rate mainly to widowhood
(and some divorce). The rate of people indicating they were covered by
a DB pension increased significantly due to either pension vesting or lack
of awareness of these benefits prior to retirement. Given financial market
conditions, both real median net worth and the ratio of net worth to
income rose substantially over the period. The rate of home ownership
actually rose, as did median home value and equity in the home. In the
aggregate, the median fraction of the portfolio allocated to home equity
changed little over this time frame.
The same data movers and nonmovers are shown in Table 14-4. Roughly
a one quarter of all households moved over this eleven-year period. Movers
started the period with greater net worth, higher incomes, and more valuable homes in 1992, though they had slightly less equity in their homes;
health, marital status, and retirement were also similar. Then between
1992 and 2004, both movers and nonmovers increased their net worth
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Table 14-4 Comparing Changes in Housing and Wealth Variables for Original
HRS Cohort: Movers versus Nonmovers
Movers
1992
1. Median net 205,938
worth ($)
71,338
2. Median
household
income ($)
2.82
3. Median
net worth/
household
income
148,060
4. Median
house
value ($)
51.7%
5. Median
home
equity/net
worth
89.4%
6. Good
health or
better
7. Married
85.5%
8. Retired
11.5%

2004

Nonmovers
Difference

1992

2004

Difference

242,000

36,062

188,440

298,000

109,560

46,500

−24,838

63,531

45,180

−18,351

4.70

165,000

1.88

16,940

2.96

121,000

5.99

153,000

3.03

31,860

37.9%

−13.7%

55.0%

52.7%

−2.4%

80.8%

− 8.6%

87.3%

77.7%

−9.6%

67.9%
62.3%

−15.6%
50.8%

85.8%
11.5%

77.8%
63.2%

−17.6%
51.8%

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Dollar amounts in $2004.

and decreased their income, though movers had a significantly smaller
rise in net worth and a larger decline in income. Median home values
also increased for both groups, though the increase was much larger
for the nonmovers, and the fraction of net worth allocated to home
equity declined substantially more for movers while it only edged down
for nonmovers. Both groups became less healthy, and retired at a similar
pace.
The fact that movers started the sample better-off but saw smaller
increases in wealth and significantly reduced their allocation to home
equity suggests that movers may have used some of their wealth gains for
spending purposes and reallocated some housing wealth to financial assets.
Another possibility is that those households who moved suffered some
type of health shock or death in the family that precipitated their move
and reallocation of wealth. We are interested in distinguishing between
the use of home equity as an insurance policy and the use of home
equity for more general retirement needs. For this reason, we estimate
a multivariate regression model linking the change in the share of net
worth allocated to home equity between 1992 and 2004, using movers as
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Table 14-5 The Impact of Moving on Home Equity Extraction: Evidence of a
Regression of Home Equity Shares Using Movers as a Control Group
Independent Variable

Moved
Changed marital status
Moved∗ changed marital status
Change in health status
Moved∗ change in health status
Log of household income
Education: < high school
Education: high school diploma
Education: some college
Education: college degree
Covered by DB pension
Constant
Adjusted R2

Dependent Variable: Change in the
Ratio of Home Equity to Net Worth,
2004–1992
(A)

(B)

(C)

−0.13 (0.011)

−0.10 (0.012)
0.10 (0.021)
−0.17 (0.029)
0.06 (0.031)

0.52 (0.006)

0.50 (0.007)

−0.07 (0.013)
0.08 (0.021)
−0.16 (0.031)
0.02 (0.017)
−0.07 (0.031)
−0.03 (0.006)
0.12 (0.021)
0.05 (0.017)
0.05 (0.018)
0.00 (0.021)
0.04 (0.012)
0.79 (0.073)

0.05

0.06

0.09

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Regressions estimated using weighted ordinary least squares. Estimated coefficients
shown with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are significant at the 95% confidence level with the exceptions of change in health status and college degree in the
specification presented in column (C).

a control group; we also include variables to capture the effect of adverse
events.
We estimate the change in home equity by taking the position in 2004
and subtracting the 1992 allocation, so that on average the change will
be negative. Results appear in Table 14-5, where the first column shows
the results of regression the change in home equity on only an indicator
variable indicating whether the household moved. The coefficient indicates that movers reduced their allocation to home equity 13 percentage
points over this period relative to nonmovers, highly significant and close
to Table 14-4. The second column also controls for whether there was
a change in marital status (including widowhood or divorce), change in
health status, and an interaction term between change in marital status
and moving. The results indicate that households who moved with no
change in marital status or health shock reduced their home equity 10
percentage points, relative to nonmovers. This result is highly significant
and represents an indication of the magnitude of home equity liquidated
through a move not accompanied by a health or marital shock, possibly
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for general retirement purposes. The interaction between moving and
marital status suggests that households who moved and had a marital status
shock reduced their home equity a further 17 percentage points beyond
movers without such an event, as their home equity served as a source of
insurance.
The third column adds other general controls for education, household income, and whether the household is covered by a DB pension,
as well as an interaction between a change in health status and moving. All variables are significant at the 95 percent confidence level with
the exception of change in health status and having a college education. The results indicate that movers with no health or marital shock
reduced their home equity by 7 percentage points, relative to nonmovers,
while those with a marital shock reduced their allocations an additional
16 percentage points; those with a health shock reduced their home equity
7 percentage points relative to movers without adverse marital and health
changes.

Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter compares the economic position of Baby Boomers with that
of current retirees, both during their preretirement years. We note that
Boomers have similar levels of net worth, and a comparable fraction of
their net worth invested in equity of their homes. Yet their homes are
more valuable, and they hold more mortgage debt against that value. Overall, Boomers have higher rates of home ownership and greater leverage
against their homes across the income spectrum. Next we assessed how
HRS retirees tapped into their housing wealth, as they transitioned into
retirement. This analysis is confounded by a sustained above-trend boom in
asset markets, yet we do find that more than a quarter of households in this
cohort moved between their early 50s and mid-60s. Further, they used the
move as an opportunity to tap into their home equity and reallocate some
of this wealth to financial assets. Home equity also serves as an insurance
policy in the event of shock such as the death of a house or deterioration
in health.
We conclude from this analysis that the recent surge in home equity
extraction is more of a trend than a cyclical phenomenon. As indicated in
Figure 14-5, this is not inconsistent with the aggregate data which show no
sign of slowing in the growth of home equity extraction relative to income,
even as the housing market has slowed. While Boomers are more leveraged
than their predecessors, they still have considerable equity in their homes.
Accordingly, we would expect the trend toward home equity extraction to
continue as this cohort ages.
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of Economic Analysis (various years); Haver Analytics (various years).)

Notes
1

A comprehensive and useful review of studies on this issue is available from the
Congressional Budget Office (November 2003).
2
These figures are taken from Federal Reserve Board of Governors (various years)
Survey of Consumer Finances and Flow of Funds, respectively.
3
Some notable examples of this work include Sheiner and Weil (1993) and Venti
and Wise (1991).
4
The lower figure is the weight of shelter in consumer spending according to the
National Income and Product Accounts published by the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (various years), while the larger number is the weight of shelter in the
Consumer Price Index published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (various
years).
5
Data on home equity debt come from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(various years). Figures on reverse mortgages come from IndyMac Bank (2005),
OFHEO (various years), and our own calculations.
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